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This paper examines the impact of downward wage rigidity (nominal and real) on 
optimal steady-state inflation. For this purpose, we extend the workhorse model of 
Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) by introducing asymmetric menu costs for wage 
setting. We estimate the key parameters by simulated method of moments, matching 
key features of the cross-sectional distribution of individual wage changes observed in 
the data. We look at five countries (the US, Germany, Portugal, Belgium and 
Finland). The calibrated heterogeneous agent models are then solved for different 
steady state rates of inflation to derive welfare implications. We find that, across the 
European countries considered, the optimal steady-state rate of inflation varies 
between zero and 2%. For the US, the results depend on the dataset used, with 
estimates of optimal inflation varying between 2% and 5%. 
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April 2009Non-technical summary
This paper contributes to a long-standing debate in macroeconomics: the
implications of downward wage rigidities for the choice of the optimal rate
of in￿ation by a central bank. A traditional argument, which goes back to
Tobin (1972), is that, in the presence of downward nominal wage rigidities,
a higher rate of in￿ation will allow easier adjustment of relative (real) wages
and will therefore "grease the wheels of the economy". Hence, in the pres-
ence of downward nominal wage rigidity, a central bank which aims at an
in￿ation rate which is too low will lead to higher steady state unemployment,
thereby reducing welfare. After the original claim by Tobin, a growing body
of empirical literature has examined the issue of whether wages are in fact
subject to downward rigidity. This evidence has consistently found signs of
downward nominal wage rigidity in the US. However, in the case of some
European countries, it failed to ￿nd evidence of downward nominal wage
rigidities; instead, evidence is found for downward real wage rigidities (i.e.
a low incidence of real wage cuts). The aim of the present paper is build a
bridge between these two strands of literature. We take the empirical evi-
dence as our starting point, and modify an existing DSGE model to allow
for a su￿ciently ￿exible wage setting mechanism that is able to match the
cross-section of individual wage changes in a wide range of economic envi-
ronments. In our approach, we do not impose a speci￿c degree of downward
wage rigidity; instead, the nature and extent of such rigidities is estimated
on the basis of the micro evidence. Speci￿cally, we propose a modi￿ed ver-
sion of the workhorse macromodel of Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000).
In the model proposed here, households are subject to idiosyncratic shocks
to their labour productivities, leading them to desire to set di￿erent wage
rates. However, household wages are subject to a ￿exible menu cost scheme
that incorporates as special cases downward nominal rigidity, downward real
rigidity, standard menu costs and ￿exible wages. A key contribution of the
paper is the estimation of the menu cost parameters of the model in order
to match the cross-sectional distribution of wage changes observed in indi-
vidual data. This enables us to take the micro data seriously and examine
its aggregate implications in a coherent and consistent manner. We estimate
the wage setting parameters of the model by simulated method of moments
using individual data for the US, Germany, Portugal, Belgium and Finland,
5
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rigidity. Once parameter values have been estimated and calibrated for the
di￿erent countries, the model is solved for a number of alternative values of
steady state in￿ation. This allows evaluating a model consistent measure of
welfare, and the welfare properties of alternative steady-state in￿ation rates
for di￿erent degrees of nominal or real rigidity. We show that our model
is able to match pretty well the cross-sectional wage change distributions
observed in the data. Once the model has been guided and disciplined by
the micro evidence, we compute model consistent welfare maximising steady
state in￿ation rates for each country. We ￿nd that for the European countries
considered, optimal in￿ation ranges from 0 (Belgium and Finland) to 2 per-
cent (Portugal) with Germany occupying an intermediate position. The US
results are highly sensitive to the dataset employed. With data uncorrected
for measurement error, we ￿nd an optimal rate of in￿ation of 2 percent.
However, using the estimates implied by the corrected data, we arrive at an
optimal rate of 5 percent.
6
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The recent monetary economics literature suggests that the optimal rate of
in￿ation is either zero or negative. In the context of the canonical New Key-
nesian model without monetary frictions, a zero rate of in￿ation maximises
welfare since it minimises the distortions caused by staggered price setting
and/or the costs of changing prices. If monetary frictions are added to the
model, e.g. via cash in advance constraints, then the optimal rate of in￿ation
becomes negative and lies in an interval between zero and the optimal rate
predicted by the classic Friedman rule (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2008). In
practice, however, central banks do not aim for zero or negative in￿ation. In
fact, the longer term in￿ation targets/objectives of central banks typically
involve positive (albeit small) rates of in￿ation (Roger and Stone, 2005).
This gap between theory and practice is striking and a number of reasons
have been put forward to explain it (a good survey is provided by Palenzuela,
Camba-Mendez, and Garc￿a (2003)).
One of the most prominent arguments in favour of the optimality of a posi-
tive rate of in￿ation is that this will allow easier adjustment of relative (real)
wages and will therefore ‘grease the wheels of the economy’. This line of
thinking goes back at least to Tobin (1972). The argument has been formal-
ized by Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996), who show that in the presence of
downward nominal wage rigidity, a central bank which aims at an in￿ation
rate which is too low will lead to higher steady state unemployment, thereby
reducing welfare. In the European context, a similar claim is put forward by
Wyplosz (2001): ‘in order to signi￿cantly reduce the (unemployment) e￿ect,
the ECB ought to aim at an in￿ation rate of more than 5%, a rate clearly
beyond the current range of acceptability. Simply allowing in￿ation to be,
in the long run, around 4% would go a long way towards eliminating the
adverse e￿ect’.
At the same time, there is a growing body of literature examining the is-
sue of whether wages are in fact subject to downward nominal rigidity (see
Kramarz (2001) and Yates (1998) for surveys of the earlier evidence, and
Fehr and G￿tte (2005) and the Special Issue in the Economic Journal in
November 2007 for di￿erent country studies). Most recently, a comprehen-
sive cross-country study has been carried out in the context of the Inter-
7
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this work has been extended in a number of directions in the context of the
Wage Dynamic Network (Messina et al., 2008). This evidence has identi￿ed
downward nominal wage rigidity in a number of countries and sectors. In-
terestingly, in the case of some European countries, there is little evidence of
downward nominal rigidities; instead, evidence is found for downward real
rigidities (i.e. a low incidence of real wage cuts).
The aim of the present paper is build a bridge between these two strands of
literature. We take the empirical evidence as our starting point, and modify
an existing DSGE model to allow for a su￿ciently ￿exible wage setting mech-
anism that is able to match the cross-section of individual wage changes in a
wide range of economic environments. In our approach, we do not impose a
speci￿c degree of downward wage rigidity; instead, the nature and extent of
such rigidities is estimated on the basis of the micro evidence. Speci￿cally,
we propose a modi￿ed version of the workhorse macromodel of Erceg, Hen-
derson and Levin (2000) (henceforth the EHL model). This model, and in
particular its treatment of wage-setting, has been highly in￿uential for the
current generation of DSGE models which are now routinely used in both
the academic literature and central banks. A key contribution of the paper
is the estimation of the menu cost parameters of the model in order to match
the cross-sectional distribution of wage changes observed in individual data.
This enables us to take the micro data seriously and examine its aggregate
implications in a coherent and consistent manner. For the purpose of es-
timation, we use IWFP data for the US, Germany, Portugal, Belgium and
Finland, which have been found to have di￿erent degrees of nominal and real
wage rigidity. To achieve our aim, our model modi￿es EHL in a number of
important dimensions.
Most important, the EHL model is extended to allow for the possibility of
downward nominal or real wage rigidities. To this end, we replace the Calvo
wage setting setup in EHL by one in which the setting of household wages
is subject to a ￿exible menu cost scheme which incorporates as special cases
downward nominal wage rigidity, downward real rigidity, standard menu
costs and ￿exible wages. We will further assume that households are subject
to idiosyncratic shocks to their labour productivities, leading them to desire
to set di￿erent wage rates. Our setup thus allows us to generate cross-
8
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to the IWFP results. This gain comes at a price of increased complexity
since we have to deal with an heterogenous agent economy. Hence, in order
to limit the heterogeneity in the model further, we replace the Calvo setting
in prices by quadratic adjustment costs. This implies that each ￿rm in the
economy will charge the same price. Finally, our focus is on the steady state
whereas EHL were primarily interested in the dynamic adjustment of the
economy to shocks. Thus, in order to have a satisfactory account of the
steady state, we introduce capital into the EHL model.
The resulting model is solved using heterogenous agent model solution tech-
niques pioneered by Aiyagari (1994) and Huggett (1993). This involves ￿nd-
ing a general equilibrium steady state characterised by constant values of the
macroeconomic aggregates (consistent with optimisation and resource con-
straints), an invariant distribution of households across household-speci￿c
state variables and consistency between individual behaviour (which is sub-
ject to idiosyncratic shocks) and aggregate outcomes. The macro parameters
of the model are calibrated, while the wage-setting parameters are estimated
from individual data through a simulated method of moments procedure.
Another goal of the paper is to examine the implications of downward nom-
inal and real rigidities for optimal steady state in￿ation. Once parameter
values have been speci￿ed and estimated, the model is solved for a num-
ber of alternative values of steady state in￿ation. We can then evaluate a
model consistent measure of welfare and the welfare properties of alternative
steady-state in￿ation rates for di￿erent degrees of nominal or real rigidity.
There appears to be a growing interest in the macroeconomic impact of down-
ward wage rigidities and this issue has been explored in a number of recent
papers. For example, Fahr and Smets (2008) model downward wage rigidity
by means of an asymmetric adjustment cost function for aggregate wages
and explore the implications for optimal monetary policy in a two-country
monetary union. Benigno and Ricci (2008) model downward wage rigidities
by assuming a strictly binding non-negativity constraint on aggregate nomi-
nal wage changes and examine the implications for the Philips curve and the
relation between the volatilities of unemployment and in￿ation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the
empirical evidence on downward wage rigidity available in the context of
9
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Section 4, we characterise the general equilibrium steady-state of this model
and outline how it can be computed. Section 5 deals with the selection of
parameter values, with a special focus on the estimation of wage rigidities.
Section 6 presents the results of the computation of optimal steady-state
in￿ation using the model with alternative estimates of downward rigidities.
Finally, Section 7 presents the conclusions.
2 Measuring downward wage rigidity
For measures of downward nominal and real rigidity we rely on the Interna-
tional Wage Flexibility Project (IWFP) methodology and data. The IWFP
was a major cross-country research network originally covering 16 countries
aiming to produce comparable information on the extent of downward rigidi-
ties measured from individual wage changes. The main focus of the project
was to identify and quantify downward rigidities (either nominal or real) in
wage setting (see Dickens et al. (2007) for a summary). The project was
extended in di￿erent dimensions within the context of the Wage Dynam-
ics Network, including new datasets and new analyses (see Messina et al.
(2008)).
The methodology adopted in the studies is as follows. For each country
dataset and each year in the sample, the distribution of percentage wage
changes across individuals who have not changed jobs in the period was
derived. In order to correct for measurement error, a methodology described
at length in Dickens and Goette (2005) was adopted. This methodology
aimed at correcting for the di￿erent sources of measurement error present in
each dataset in order to guarantee, to the extent possible, the comparability
of results across countries and data sources. Deviations of the true (error-
free) wage-change distributions from a symmetric distribution were used to
construct measures of downward nominal and real rigidities.
Our focus in this paper will be on the IWFP results for ￿ve countries: the
US, Germany, Portugal, Belgium and Finland. The ￿rst three countries in
this list are characterized by di￿erent degrees of downward nominal wage
rigidity (DNWR). In contrast, in the last two countries there is little evi-
dence of nominal rigidity but clear evidence or downward real wage rigidities
10
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presented in Table 1. All datasets, with the exception of US data, are ob-
tained from administrative sources. The US data is derived from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics, a household survey that features much smaller
sample sizes than in the other four cases, and a larger extent of measurement
error. This has a large impact on the estimates of rigidity derived below, de-
pending on whether measurement error has been corrected for or not. Hence,
in the case of the US we present results based on both, the raw data and
the distributions corrected for measurement errors. In the other four cases,
we derive the relevant statistics to be matched from error-free wage change
distributions.
By way of illustration, representative histograms of the wage change distri-
butions are presented in the left hand columns of Figures 1 and 2. A notable
feature of these histograms (to varying degrees) in the case of the US, Ger-
many and Portugal, is the spike at zero and the lack of mass at wage changes
below zero. This is interpreted by Dickens et al. (2007) as evidence of down-
ward nominal rigidity. These features are not apparent in the histograms
for Belgium and Finland, where instead there appears to be some bunching
of the wage changes in the vicinity of the in￿ation rate, particularly in the
latter country, an indicator of downward real wage rigidity. In both sets of
histograms, there is another feature, which has not attracted much attention
but which will complicate our modelling of wage setting. Speci￿cally, there
is a notable non-zero mass at small absolute wage changes. This feature
is inconsistent with pure menu cost models, which would normally imply a
‘zone of inaction’ and thus lead to the absence of small wage changes.
On the basis of the analysis of the wage-change histograms, the IWFP com-
puted two simple summary measures of rigidity.1 Note that, in a rather
mechanical way, a higher in￿ation rate would imply a lower spike at zero,
since a smaller fraction of workers would have been scheduled for a nominal
wage cut. The IWFP researchers sought measures of rigidity that are largely
invariant with respect to macroeconomic conditions. Deriving measures of
1We use here the simple measures of wage rigidity as described in Dickens et al. (2007).
The IWFP developed a second methodology to estimate downward rigidities based on a
mixed method of moments that contrasts the actual (corrected for measurement error)
distribution of wage changes with an estimated notional (2-sided Weibull) distribution
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where fn is the fraction of workers with nominal wage freezes and cn is
the fraction with nominal wage cuts. In the analysis below we will match
both fn and cn separately. Measuring DRWR is more di￿cult. Probably
with the sole exception of Finland, the wage-change histograms shown in
Figures 1 and 2 do not present a sharp spike in the vicinity of the in￿ation
rate, as happens with the spike at zero used to measure DNWR. This is not
surprising, as in￿ation expectations are likely to di￿er across workers and
￿rms. Hence, Dickens et al. (2007) measured DRWR using information on
the fraction of observations missing from the lower tail, below the expected
rate of in￿ation, as compared to the equivalent area of the upper tail of the
distribution (that is, the area from {median + [ median ￿ expected in￿ation]}




where fu is the fraction of observations in the upper tail of the wage change
distribution and fl is the fraction of observations in the lower tail below
expected in￿ation (¼e), which is approximated by the prediction of a regres-
sion on past values. The ratio is multiplied by two to account for the fact
that even if the observed rate of in￿ation coincides with the median of the
expected rate of in￿ation in each year, half of all wage changes will in fact be
based on in￿ation expectations that are lower than actual in￿ation. If these
workers receive a wage change equal to their own expected rate of in￿ation,
their wage change will be below the observed rate of in￿ation, hence biasing
downwards the estimates of DRWR.
Average estimates of the percentage of workers receiving wage cuts, the spike
at zero and DRWR are displayed in Table 4. As visual inspection of the
histograms suggested, downward nominal wage rigidity dominates in the
US, Germany and Portugal, with the US being the country displaying the
highest concentration of observations that received zero wage changes. In
contrast, all workers in Finland are potentially subject to real rigidity, while
12
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nearly 60% of the Belgium workforce.
3 The model
Erceg et al. (2000) presented a microfounded 6-equation DSGE model. The
model features monopolistically competitive goods and labour markets with
both price and wage setting subject to Calvo schemes. To facilitate aggre-
gation, they assumed existence of a complete contingent claims market for
consumption (but not for leisure). This implies that, despite di￿erent labour
market outcomes, consumption is equal across households. Since their inter-
est was in ￿uctuations around the steady state, they assumed, for analytical
convenience, that the capital stock was ￿xed. The most notable feature of
the model, for our purposes, is the treatment of wage setting. In the EHL
setup, households are monopolistically competitive labour suppliers. Facing
a downward demand for their speci￿c labour type from a labour aggregator,
households set nominal wages as part of their utility maximisation problem.
In doing so, they are subject to a Calvo contracting scheme, which implies
that each period a fraction of the households are unable to change their
wages.2
This approach to modelling wage setting has been highly in￿uential. Most
of the leading DSGE models which are used for monetary policy analysis
in central banks and in the academic literature (for example, Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2003),
Smets and Wouters (2003), the Federal Reserve Board’s Sigma model (Erceg,
Guerrieri, and Gust, 2007) and the ECB’s New Area-Wide Model (Coenen,
McAdam, and Straub, 2008) incorporate this type of wage setting scheme.
Given its in￿uential role as a basis for many of the models currently used for
monetary policy evaluation, it seems natural to take the EHL model as the
starting point for our analysis.
In order to replicate the cross sectional distribution of wages observed in
the di￿erent country datasets, the main extension we make to EHL relates
to the wage setting process. While retaining the feature that wages are set
2An alternative approach, in which ￿rms, rather than households, are the wage setters
is developed by Casares (2007)
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cial respects. First, we assume that households are subject to idiosyncratic
(but persistent) productivity shocks. Second, we replace the Calvo scheme
for wage setting by a regime in which households are subject to menu costs
of changing wages that are potentially asymmetric (it is more costly to cut
rather than to increase wages) and stochastic (menu costs will apply only
some of the time, determined by a simple Bernoulli process). In order to
limit the extent of heterogeneity in the model, we retain the EHL assump-
tion of a complete contingent claims market for consumption (implying that
consumption and asset holdings are equal across households). In addition,
for the same reason, we replace the Calvo scheme for price setting by one in
which ￿rms are subject to quadratic adjustment costs for changing prices ￿
la Rotemberg (1987). This of course implies that all ￿rms charge the same
price at each point in time. Finally, since, in contrast to EHL, our focus is
on the steady state, we introduce endogenous capital formation.
We consider a single-good closed economy model. In this economy, there is
a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods ￿rms pro-
ducing output with capital and labour inputs and a standard Cobb-Douglas
technology. These intermediate goods are then sold to ￿nal goods ￿rms,
which bundle them and sell the ￿nal goods to households. Final goods ￿rms
are assumed to behave competitively. We assume that the intermediate
goods ￿rms are subject to quadratic costs of adjusting prices. These ￿rms
rent the capital stock from the households while they purchase labour inputs
from a standard labour aggregator.
There is a continuum of households owning the capital stock that are subject
to idiosyncratic shocks to their productivity (which we assume is given by
an AR(1) process). In the labour market, households supply di￿erentiated
labour services to the labour aggregator. With risk sharing for consumption
in place, households choose paths for consumption to maximise their utility.
This implies that all households will have the same level of consumption
and wealth. In each household, wages are set by a wage-setter in order to
maximise utility, subject to wage adjustment costs and taking as given the
level of consumption of the household. Wages are set on a right to manage
scheme, which implies that hours worked by the household are on the labour
demand curve at all times.
14
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goods and is assumed to balance its budget in each period by levying lump
sum taxes on the households. Our focus throughout the paper will be on the
steady state of the economy in which there are no aggregate shocks (but of
course there are idiosyncratic shocks to individual productivity).
3.1 Final goods ￿rms
Final good ￿rms combine the output of the intermediate good ￿rms using a
Dixit-Stiglitz technology. These ￿rms act competitively and their pro￿ts are
zero. Their ￿rst order conditions for pro￿t maximization imply a demand







where pt(i) is the price charged by the i’th intermediate good ￿rm, Pt is the
aggregate price index and ²p is the elasticity of substitution across interme-
diate goods.
3.2 Intermediate goods ￿rms
There is a continuum of intermediate goods ￿rms that employ capital and
labour to produce output, which is sold to the ￿nal goods ￿rms. The ￿rms are
monopolistically competitive and choose their individual prices to maximise
the present discounted value of their pro￿ts subject to the demand for their
product (given by (1)) and a Cobb-Douglas production function.
Speci￿cally, they choose paths for their capital and labour inputs to maximise







where ¯ is the discount factor and real pro￿ts per period are given by:
Rt =
pt(i)yt(i) ¡ Wtlt(i) ¡ rk
t kt(i)
Pt
¡ cp (pt(i);pt¡1(i)) (3)
where Wt is the aggregate wage rate, rk
t the rental price of capital, and the
15
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Output is given by the following Cobb-Douglas technology:
yt(i) = ®0k(i)®l(i)1¡®













































p denote respectively the derivatives of the price adjustment
cost function (4) with respect to its ￿rst and second arguments, while Fl and
Fk are the marginal products of labour and capital respectively.
3.3 Households
There is a continuum of in￿nitely-lived households of unit mass, indexed by
h 2 [0;1], which supply their labour to the labour aggregator, own the capital
stock and rent it to ￿rms and choose a path for consumption to maximise













Households’ wealth takes the form of holdings of the capital stock (k), shares
in the intermediate goods ￿rms and a set of state-contingent securities that
insures their consumption against adverse labour market outcomes. Their
budget constraint is:
Pt (ct(h) + it(h)) + ±t+1;tBt(h) ¡ Bt¡1(h) =
w(h)lt(h) + rk
t kt(h) + ¡t (h) ¡ ¿t (h)
16
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ditures. wt(h) and lt(h) are the household-speci￿c wages and hours worked
respectively. kt(h) is the household’s capital stock while rk
t is the rental
rate on capital. Each household owns an equal share of all ￿rms, and re-
ceives an aliquot denoted by ¡t (h), while ¿t (h) is a lump sum tax levied
by the government. As in EHL, Bt(h) denotes a vector of household hold-
ings of state contingent bonds and ±t+1;t is a vector of prices of one unit of
the corresponding bonds. These bonds provide complete insurance for the
household income against household-speci￿c labour market outcomes. Under
these conditions, EHL show that household consumption (but not leisure)
will be equal across households.
In addition, households are subject to the following capital accumulation
equation:
kt+1(h) = it(h) + (1 ¡ ±)kt(h) (8)
where ± is the depreciation rate. This is a modi￿ed version of EHL equa-










where it is the nominal risk free interest rate, and Uct the marginal utility of
consumption, which, by virtue of the assumptions on risk sharing, is equal
across households. The ￿rst order condition for the capital stock implies:
rk
t = it ¡ Et¼t+1 + ± (10)
where ¼t+1 is next period’s in￿ation rate.
3.4 The labour market
3.4.1 The labour aggregator
Labour input is supplied to ￿rms via a labour aggregator that combines
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from EHL is the introduction of the household’s idiosyncratic productivity
shock given by the term qt(h). It is assumed that qt(h) follows a stochastic
process:
log(qt+1(h)) = ½log(qt(h)) + ²t+1(h) (12)
The ￿rst order condition for cost minimisation by the aggregator implies the










Ceteris paribus, an increase in the productivity of an individual household
implies an increase in labour demand for that household, while labour de-
mand depends negatively on the relative wage charged by the household.
As usual, it is assumed that the labour aggregator behaves competitively,


















We assume that there is a wage setter in each household. Each period, the
household wage setter chooses the wage rate for its household, taking as
given the households consumption path (which, as indicated earlier, is equal
across households) and the demand for labour from the aggregator, which
is given by (13). Thus we assume a right to manage setup in which the
level of hours worked is determined by the labour demand function of the
aggregator. Given the household’s utility function (7), the household wage

















Working Paper Series No 1048
April 2009The last term on the right hand side of this expression is simply the disutil-
ity to the household from supplying labour services. The remaining part is
the real net labour income of the household (wage income minus wage ad-
justment costs) converted into ‘utils’ by multiplying by the marginal utility
of consumption. In the absence of wage adjustment costs, our setup would
imply that the optimal policy for the wage setter would be the standard
policy of setting the wage as a markup over the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure. If, instead, the household were subject to
a Calvo scheme, the optimal policy of the wage-setter would be identical to
the solution obtained by EHL.
In contrast, with a view to matching the cross-sectional distribution of indi-
vidual wages observed in the data, we assume that the wage-setter is subject
to a stochastic asymmetric menu cost. In the most general case, the cost of
changing wages is given by:
cw (wt(h);wt¡1(h);It(h)) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
It(h)c+Wt if wt(h) > wt¡1(h))






< (1 + ¼t)
0 if wt(h) = wt¡1(h)
(17)





1 with prob p
0 with prob (1 ¡ p)
(18)
and c+ is the cost of changing the wage (as a percent of the aggregate wage)
when the wage is increased. c¡ is the cost of changing the wage when the
wage is decreased. If c¡ > c+ then there is downward nominal rigidity,
whereas if these two parameters are equal, the model reduces to a standard
menu cost setup. cR is the cost of increasing wages at a rate below the
in￿ation rate (¼t). This parameter captures potential downward real rigidity
on the part of households (i.e. an unwillingness to undergo real wage cuts).
The stochastic element in the cost function is introduced for the following
reason. In a standard menu cost setting, the optimal decision rule would
involve a zone of inaction in which wages would not be changed unless the
shocks to productivity were su￿ciently large. This would imply that we
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consistent with most of the observed wage change distributions analyzed
in the context of the IWFP. Stochastic menu costs allow us to overcome
this limitation. The particular form chosen, an iid Bernoulli process, is the
simplest way of introducing this element in order to match the data.
Normalising real variables by dividing by aggregate trend productivity (and,
for nominal variables, the aggregate price level) to arrive at a stationary
model, the problem of the wage setter can now be expressed as a standard
dynamic programming problem with the value function given by:
V (qt(h); ~ wt¡1(h);It(h);£) = Max
~ wt(h)
[Át + ¯EtV (qt+1(h); ~ wt(i);It+1;£)]
(19)
where the maximisation is carried out with respect to ~ wt, the normalised
household wage rate.
The value function depends on a set of parameters (£) and 3 household-
speci￿c state variables: the current period idiosyncratic shock (qt(h)), the
previous period’s wage set by the household ( ~ wt¡1(h)) and the Bernoulli
variable (It(h)), which indicates whether the household is subject to menu
costs in the current period. The parameter vector (£) entering into the value
function includes the relevant parameters of household preferences and ￿rm
behaviour. It also includes the values of the aggregate macroeconomic vari-
ables, which in￿uence the wage-setter’s choice of the household wage rate.
Since we are focussing on the case of a stationary state, these aggregate
variables will all be constant at their steady state values and are treated as
parameters by the wage-setter.
The solution to the wage-setter’s dynamic programming problem is a decision
rule for the current period wage rate to be charged by the household:
wt(h) = G(qt(h);wt¡1(h);It(h)j£) (20)
The optimal wage depends on the current period idiosyncratic productivity,
the wage set in the previous period and the state variable that indicates
whether or not the household is subject to menu costs in the current period.
The properties of decision rules in the context of menu cost models have been
20
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1048
April 2009extensively studied in the context of inventory behaviour and investment
(see, for example, Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989) and Dixit and Pindyck
(1994)). They have also been applied to price-setting problems (e.g. by
Golosov and Lucas (2007) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2006)). In the case
of downward nominal wage rigidity, Elsby (2006) develops a model in which
downward nominal rigidity of wages is captured by a menu cost for cutting
wages and explores its properties.
Typically, the resulting decision rule is characterised by a ‘zone of inac-
tion’: for su￿ciently small shocks, agents do not change the wage, since
the discounted gains from doing so would not o￿set the value of the menu
cost. When shocks become su￿ciently large, however, they induce agents to
change wages in line with the changes that would occur in the absence of
frictions. When the menu costs are asymmetric, the resulting zone of inac-
tion will also be asymmetric. For example, with downward nominal rigidity,
agents would require larger shocks to induce them to cut wages than to in-
crease wages. To illustrate, Figure 3 shows an example. The ￿gure shows
two decision rules: when the wage-setter is subject to menu costs and when
menu costs are absent. The latter rule is straightforward. In the absence
of menu costs our model predicts that the wage chosen by the household
is simply a (log) linear function of the idiosyncratic productivity shock. In
contrast, when menu costs apply, an asymmetric zone of inaction will apply.
Relatively small positive shocks are su￿cient to induce the agent to raise
wages. In contrast, negative shocks need to be rather large before the agent
will cut wages.
4 General Equilibrium
We concentrate on the case in which the only source of uncertainty is the
idiosyncratic shocks to the productivity of the individual households. Then,
the steady state of the model described above is given as the solution to the
following system of equations, where a~ over a variable denotes the value of
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~ Y = ~ C + ~ I + ~ CG ¡ ~ Cw ¡ ~ CP (21)
where ~ Y , ~ C, ~ I and ~ CG are output, private consumption, investment and
government consumption (all scaled by trend aggregate productivity).
~ Cw and ~ CP denote respectively the steady state values of the costs of
adjusting wages and prices. Clearly, both of these magnitudes depend
on the steady state rate of in￿ation.
2. The steady-state of the capital accumulation equation (8):
~ I = (± + g) ~ K (22)
where g is aggregate trend productivity growth and ± is the deprecia-
tion rate.
3. From the consumer’s Euler equation (9), we obtain an expression for






4. In steady state, the ￿rm’s ￿rst order conditions for labour and capital
((5) and (6)) become:








where ¹p is the steady state markup of prices over marginal costs.3
5. Finally, the production function is given by:
~ Y = ®0 ~ K®L
1¡®
(26)
3Given our assumptions on the quadratic costs of price adjustment as in (4), the ex-
pression for the markup is given by ¹P =
²P
²P +1¡Áp¼(1+¼)+¯Áp(1+g)¼(1+¼). In the case of
zero steady state in￿ation, this reduces to the standard expression, ¹P =
²P
²P+1 where ²P
is the price elasticity of demand for intermediate goods ￿rms.
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equilibrium of this economy. In our setup, this corresponds to a situation in
which all aggregate variables and the joint distribution of individual wages
and productivity are constant over time, while households and ￿rms opti-
mality conditions and resource constraints are satis￿ed. While aggregate
variables are constant, households are subject to idiosyncratic productivity
shocks, so that for the individual household wages and hours worked di￿er
over time. Speci￿cally, for a given set of parameters (including ¼ and g), a
stationary equilibrium for this economy is a value function for the household
wage setter and an associated decision rule for wages G(q;wt¡1;I), aggregate
quantities
n
~ Y ; ~ C; ~ I; ~ K;L
o
and aggregate factor prices fr;Wg, such that:
1. The representative intermediate ￿rm maximises pro￿ts, so (24) and
(25) hold.
2. Households optimise. Given the aggregate variables, the decision rule
G(q;wt¡1;I) solves the household wage setter’s problem and the inter-
est rate is given by the household’s Euler equation (23).
3. The goods market clears (21).


























6. The governments budget constraint is balanced ( ~ CG = ~ ¿)
7. There is a stationary joint distribution F(w;q) of [w(h);q(h)].
To compute the stationary equilibrium of the model we proceed as follows
(see the Appendix for more computational details). First, we pick a set of
parameters. With these parameters, (23) gives us the steady state interest
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Second, we pick a starting value for aggregate hours worked. Third, with
this value, we use equations (21) to (25) to determine the steady state values
of
n
~ Y ; ~ C; ~ I; ~ K
o
: Fourth, using the resulting steady state values, we solve the
dynamic optimisation problem of the wage setter. To compute the solution,
we chose discrete grids for w(h) and q(h) and solve the wage-setter’s prob-
lem using discrete state dynamic programming. Fifth, using the decision
rule that solves this problem combined with the stochastic process for q, we
derive the invariant joint distribution for w(h) and q(h):
F(wi;qi) = Prob(wt¡1(h) = wi;qt(h) = qi) (30)
Sixth, we use a discrete approximation of (14) to aggregate across households
and to arrive at a model-consistent measure of the aggregate wage rate. If
this wage is not equal to the steady state wage given by (29), we chose a new
value for hours worked and iterate until both measures of wages are equal.
Following Holden (2005), we can illustrate the determination of the general
equilibrium in the steady state and the implications of downward wage rigidi-
ties using a simple diagram in the aggregate wage - aggregate hours space.
In Figure 4 the horizontal line is the long run demand for labour (or, alter-
natively, the price setting equation). Since prices are set as a ￿xed markup
(¹p) over marginal costs, and the marginal product of labour is constant in
the long run (adjusted for trends in productivity) the steady state wage rate
is also constant (as shown in 29) and can be expressed as the inverse of the
price-markup times the marginal product of labour.
Turning to wage setting, let the locus (W1W1) indicate the aggregate wage
that would come from household wage-setting, at di￿erent levels of hours
worked (L), in the absence of wage adjustment costs. In this case, each
household would set a wage equal to a markup over its marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure. In this frictionless case, equi-
librium is given by the point A with hours worked at L1: Even without wage
adjustment costs, household market power in setting wages would give rise
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be above (and hours worked, below) the socially optimal level. The presence
of downward wage rigidity is likely to exacerbate this distortion. If down-
ward rigidity (either real or nominal) binds for some households who have
been a￿ected by adverse idiosyncratic productivity shocks, they would not
be willing to set their wages at the frictionless level (i.e. they will not cut
their wages). Hence, average wages in the economy would be higher for any
given level of hours worked. As a result, the wage setting curve under bind-
ing downward wage rigidity, (W2W2), will be to the left of the frictionless
curve. Hence, equilibrium hours worked would be lower.
How are these distortions related to the rate of in￿ation? Consider ￿rst
the case of downward nominal wage rigidity. As steady-state in￿ation falls,
downward nominal wage rigidity will become more binding for households.
Thus as in￿ation falls, the (WW) curve will shift more and more to the left,
leading to less hours worked. Lower in￿ation, therefore, will be associated
with higher levels of the aggregate labour market distortion. This grease
e￿ect of higher in￿ation is what Tobin (1972) had in mind. In contrast,
when downward real wage rigidity is the only friction a￿ecting household
wage setting, changes in the steady state in￿ation rate will not alter the
incidence of downward rigidity across households. Thus the (WW) curve
would not shift in response to changes in the in￿ation rate.
The e￿ect of changes in the steady state rate of in￿ation on the aggregate
labour market distortion, and thus on hours, will be an important, but not
necessarily the dominant component in￿uencing the welfare gains or losses
from di￿erent steady-state in￿ation rates, which are examined below.
5 Calibration and estimation of wage-setting pa-
rameters
The period of the model is annual. We calibrate the model following a twin
track approach. A subset of the parameters (e.g. the rate of time pref-
erence, intertemporal rate of substitutions, etc.) is selected from standard
values in the literature, or matching features of the aggregate data. The
key parameters of our problem, those related to the household’s wage set-
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a simulated method of moments methodology. The values of both sets of
parameters are shown in Tables 2 and 3.
5.1 Calibrated parameters
As regards the households utility function, we assume that utility is logarith-
mic in consumption (implying a value of ¾ = 1). The coe￿cient on labour in
the utility function (Â) is set to 1.5, close to the posterior mean reported by
Smets and Wouters (2007). This implies a Frisch elasticity of labour supply
of 2
3. The elasticities of the aggregators’ demand for both labour (µW) and
intermediate goods (²P) are both set to -11, implying steady state markups
of 10%. The coe￿cient ° in the utility function is a normalising constant,
chosen to yield a steady state level of hours of unity in the absence of costs
of adjusting prices and wages. We assume an annual discount factor (¯) of
0.95. In order to match the data for the US economy regarding the shares
of investment and government consumption in output over the period 1987-
1997, the depreciation rate (±) is set to 0.08 while the share of government
consumption is set to 0.19. The share of capital in the production function
(®) is set to the standard value of 0.3. As regards the parameter governing
the costs of changing prices ÁP in (4) we adopt the following procedure. As
is well known (see, for example, Khan (2005)) there is an isomorphism be-
tween the Phillips Curve generated by price setting under Calvo contracting
and under quadratic adjustment costs.4 We assume a value for the Calvo
parameter (which gives the percentage of ￿rms unable to change their price
each quarter) of 0.63, a simple average of the estimates reported by Smets
and Wouters (2007) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). This,
together with the other parameter values indicated above, implies a value of
ÁP of 45 (in quarterly terms).5 Finally, we set ½, the AR1 coe￿cient in the
process for idiosyncratic productivity shocks in (12) equal to 0.9. This lies
4However, while up to a ￿rst order Rotemberg and Calvo price setting may generate
identical Philips curves, this does not necessarily imply that they have the same welfare
implications (see Lombardo and Vestin (2008) for an example). In the Rotemberg setup
all ￿rms charge the same price, so there is, in contrast to the Calvo approach, no distortion
coming from the fact that ￿rms charge di￿erent prices for the same product. On the other
hand, since changing prices does not involve a physical cost in the Calvo setup, there are
no deadweight losses from changing prices in this case, di￿erently from Rotemberg pricing.
5Let ³p denote the Calvo parameter (i.e. the percentage of ￿rms not changing price
each quarter). As shown by Khan (2005), this implies a value for ÁP given by ÁP =
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US reported by Guvenen (2007).6
5.2 Estimation of the wage-setting parameters
The key parameters in our study are the household wage setting parameters
fp;c+;c¡;cR and ¾²g; which are estimated employing the indirect inference
method proposed by Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault (1993). Speci￿cally,
for a given set of parameter values, and values for relevant macroeconomic
aggregates,7 we solve the household’s wage setting problem using value func-
tion iteration and derive the associated decision rule of the household. Given
this rule and the stochastic process for idiosyncratic productivity, we can de-
rive the implied stationary distribution for fw(i);q(i)g.8 We then derive the
stationary distribution of percentage wage changes. We chose values for our




from the moments obtained from the individual data on
actual (or estimated error free) wage changes
¡
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The moments that we match are: the standard deviation of wage changes,
the proportion of wage changes that are zero, the proportion of wage changes
that are less than zero, the mean wage increase and the mean wage decrease.
In addition, in the case where we are investigating real wage rigidity, we
also include either the IWFP indicator (DRWR) described above or the
percentage of wage changes below the in￿ation rate.9
¡(1+²P )³P
(1¡³P )(1¡¯³P )
6Dickens and Goette (2005) assume that the log of individual earnings follows a random
walk, which would correspond to ½ = 1. We do not follow this approach since it would
imply that there would not exist a stationary distribution of (log) wages.
7In particular, for the estimation we use the sample averages in each of the countries
for productivity growth and in￿ation (see Appendix for further details).
8In order to solve the household’s problem we need aggregate values for the variables:
detrended real wages and consumption as well as in￿ation and productivity growth. For
these we use averages of macro data for the period obtained from the FRED database
of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for the US and the European Commission’s
AMECO database for European countries.
9Given the computational burden involved and the prior information available from
the IWFP, we do not attempt to estimate all 5 parameters using all of the moments
listed above. For cases involving nominal rigidity (US, Germany, Portugal), we do not
27
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1048
April 2009We assume that the ²t(i) are distributed as iid Laplace, a special case of the
two-sided Weibull distribution employed by Dickens et al. (2007). We ap-
proximate the AR process for idiosyncratic productivity by using the Marked
chain approach of Tauchen (1986). In implementing our indirect inference
algorithm we set ­ = I.
Table 4 presents the moments calculated from the data while Table 5 shows
the moments implied by the various country models given the estimated
parameters. In addition, Figures 1 and 2 show representative histograms of
the wage change distribution based on individual data (left columns) and
the histograms generated by the model (right columns) for the respective
country.
The ￿rst observation from these results is that, overall, the models appear
to do a good job in matching the moments of the wage change data and in
generating histograms which are reasonably close to those of the data.10
In regard to the speci￿c parameter estimates a number of comments are in
order. First, in line with Dickens et al. (2007), there appears to be convincing
evidence of downward nominal rigidity in the US, Germany and Portugal.
In contrast, Finland exhibits clear signs of downward real wage rigidity. In
the case of Belgium, our results suggest some weak evidence of downward
real rigidity.
Looking at the results in more detail, for the US we have two datasets, the
IWFP data without correction for measurement error (denoted US 1) and
the dataset with correction for measurement error (denoted US 2). For US 1,
the parameter p is estimated at 0.49, suggesting that households are subject
to menu costs just half of the time. The estimated values of the menu cost
parameters point to a cost of decreasing wages which is ten times larger
than the cost of increasing wages, thereby consistent with the existence of
downward nominal rigidity. The estimated value of the parameters suggests
that the cost of reducing wages to the household amounts to some 10% of
use moments measuring real rigidity and estimate only parameters relevant to nominal
rigidity. In the case of real rigidity (Belgium and Finland), we estimate only parameters
relevant to real rigidity using the following moments: standard deviation, DRWR or, in
the case of Finland, the percent of observations below the in￿ation rate.
10In the case of Germany, however, the model has some di￿culties matching the low
incidence of small positive increases found in the data (which could either re￿ect real wage
rigidity or menu costs for positive wage changes).
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The second dataset (US 2) implies a very high degree of downward nominal
wage rigidity. The probability of menu costs applying is much higher (0.8)
while the estimated cost of cutting wages amounts to nearly 40% of the
average annual wage in the economy.
For Germany, downward nominal wage rigidity is found to be much less
than in the US. The estimated cost of cutting wages in the presence of menu
costs amounts to 2 percent of the annual wage. In Portugal, downward
nominal rigidity is found to be more than twice as high as Germany and the
probability of menu costs applying is also notably higher.
There is clear evidence of real wage rigidity in the case of Finland. The
cost of cutting real wages in the presence of menu costs are sizable, at 7%
of the annual average wage, but more importantly real rigidity applies to all
workers (p is equal to 1). In Belgium, the evidence from both the histograms
and the estimates suggests a rather mild degree of downward real rigidity, in
comparison.
6 Computation of optimal steady-state in￿ation
In the stationary state of the model outlined above, the set of households
enjoy the same level of consumption, savings and wealth by virtue of our as-
sumption of complete markets for consumption. However, households di￿er
in regard to their labour market situation. Due to the presence of idiosyn-
cratic productivity shocks, wages and hours worked di￿er across households.
This heterogeneity is summarised by the invariant distribution of (w;q) given
by (30). For our analysis we use a Benthamite welfare function adding up the
welfare of the di￿erent households. This is computed by aggregating utility


















For the di￿erent cases we have examined, we compute welfare at di￿erent
steady state in￿ation rates using the following procedure. First we take a
grid of possible in￿ation rates, speci￿cally we consider in￿ation rates between
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across countries, we assume that, apart from the wage-setting parameters,
all of the remaining parameters are equal across countries (as given in Table
2). We also set steady-state productivity growth to a common value, 1%
per annum, for all countries. Given the computational burden involved in
the calculations, we con￿ne ourselves to integer values of the in￿ation rate.
Second, for each in￿ation rate we solve the model as described in Section 4
and compute welfare using (32).
The di￿erences in welfare due to di￿erent steady state in￿ation rates may
be decomposed into the following elements:
1. Markup: the aggregate labour market distortion as discussed in Section
4. In the presence of downward wage rigidity, changes in the in￿ation
rate lead to changes in the e￿ective markup of the aggregate wage over
the marginal rate of substitution. This leads to changes in total hours
worked, output and consumption, a￿ecting household welfare.
2. Labour distortion: the presence of menu costs leads households to set
wages at levels which di￿er from the frictionless wage. As a result,
the allocation of hours across households (given by its labour demand
function), for a given level of aggregate hours, will not be socially
optimal. This distortion, which is analogous to the price distortion
that arises under Calvo price-setting, can be computed by solving a
central planners problem for allocating a given level of total hours
across households and comparing it with the actual allocation across
households.
3. Adjustment costs for prices: the deadweight costs to society of non-
zero in￿ation due to the assumed quadratic costs of changing prices.
This is the so-called ‘sand’ e￿ect of in￿ation, which counteracts the
grease e￿ects mentioned above.
4. Adjustment costs for wages: the deadweight costs to society stemming
from the menu costs of changing wages, which, like price adjustment
costs, are assumed in our setup to reduce the amount of produced
resources available for consumption.
In the absence of any costs of changing wages, the optimal rate of in￿ation
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costs of changing prices, in line with the predictions of the New Keynesian
model mentioned in the introduction. Similarly, if wage rigidity takes the
form of downward real wage rigidity, then the optimal rate of in￿ation will
also be zero. This is the case since changes in the in￿ation rate - a nominal
variable - do not a￿ect the incidence of wage adjustment costs in the economy.
In the presence of downward nominal rigidity the optimal rate of in￿ation
will be greater than zero in our model. It will occur at the level that balances
the welfare costs due to wage adjustment, (1), (2) and (4) above, with the
costs of non-zero in￿ation due to (3).
Figures 5 to 12 illustrate the results of the computation. The ￿gures show,
for each rate of in￿ation in the chosen grid: the levels of welfare, output, con-
sumption and employment. In addition, to illustrate the e￿ects of in￿ation
on the wage change distribution we also show the percentages of zero wage
changes and negative wage changes. Finally, the three key components in￿u-
encing welfare complete the picture: the labour distortion (item (2) above),
the costs of changing prices and the costs of changing wages. Where rele-
vant, we also show how the changes in welfare are decomposed into the four
factors outlined above.
The ￿rst example (Figure 5) shows the case where there are no wage ad-
justment costs. As expected, welfare attains its maximum at zero in￿ation.
Interestingly, output and employment are lowest at this point. This sim-
ply re￿ects the fact that, the more in￿ation departs from zero, the more
agents must work in order to o￿set the adverse e￿ects on their utility of the
deadweight costs of price adjustment.
The next example (Figure 6) show the results for a stylised case involving
only real wage rigidities (in particular we set cR = 0:1, implying a cost of
cutting real wages amounting to 10% of the average wage). We see in this
case that the optimal rate of in￿ation is zero, con￿rming the arguments made
earlier.
We move next to the relationship between in￿ation and welfare in our esti-
mated models. Let us ￿rst consider US 1: the US data without adjustment
for measurement error (Figure 7). Here, welfare attains its maximum at
an in￿ation rate of 2% per annum. At negative or small positive rates of
in￿ation, the costs of changing wages and the labour distortion are high.
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ever, beyond zero in￿ation, these welfare gains are increasingly o￿set by the
sand e￿ects of in￿ation, due to the costs of changing prices. Output and
hours worked rise as in￿ation increases, primarily re￿ecting a diminishing
aggregate labour market wedge as downward nominal rigidity becomes less
binding. In this vein, we also observe a decline in the share of zero wage
changes. Figure 8 shows the decomposition of these welfare changes accord-
ing to the four components listed above. The baseline case is an in￿ation
rate of -3%, the lowest rate we consider. Increasing in￿ation from this low
level leads to sizeable gains in welfare, which reach a peak at the optimal
rate of 2%, where welfare (measured in consumption equivalents) is some 2%
higher than the baseline. The main sources of the gain are the reductions in
the labour market markup and in the wage adjustment costs. Over the range
of in￿ation rates the contribution from savings on wage adjustment costs in-
creases monotonically. This re￿ects the estimated asymmetry of these costs
combined with the fact that higher in￿ation rates reduces the incidence of
nominal wage cuts. It is worth noting that the di￿erences in welfare between
the optimal in￿ation rate and in￿ation rates in the vicinity of the optimal
rate are rather small.
The case of Portugal (Figure 11) is similar to the previous one, with welfare
reaching its maximum at 2% in￿ation. The decomposition of welfare changes
in the Portuguese and US 1 cases are, as one would expect comparing the
estimated parameters, similar (Figure 12)
In the case of Germany, a country presenting a lower degree of downward
nominal rigidity than Portugal according to our estimates, the optimal rate
of in￿ation is estimated at 1%. Here, as well, welfare di￿erences between the
optimal rate and the neighbouring rates are rather limited.
As was noted above, when US data has been adjusted for measurement
error (US 2), the estimated cost of cutting wages was very high (amounting
to nearly 40% of the average annual wage). As shown in Figure 13, this
has stark implications for the optimal rate of in￿ation, which is estimated
at 5%, close to the level indicated by Wyplosz (2001). As before, di￿erences
in welfare are rather limited in the vicinity of optimal in￿ation, but moving
from 0% in￿ation to the optimal rate results in substantial welfare gains,
almost 4% of consumption. These decompositions are shown in Figure 14.
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changes in the level of in￿ation do not a￿ect the incidence of the rigidity.
Thus, in both the case of Belgium and Finland, the optimal rate of in￿ation
is found to be zero, since this rate minimises the costs of changing prices.
7 Conclusions
This paper examines the issue of the optimal steady state rate of in￿ation in
the presence of downward wage rigidities. For this purpose, we modify the
workhorse model of Erceg et al. (2000) by allowing for potentially asymmetric
menu costs for changing household wages. Further, we use individual data on
wage changes for 5 countries (US, Germany, Belgium, Portugal and Finland)
to estimate the size of the menu costs using simulated method of moments.
The results point to signi￿cant downward nominal rigidity in the case of the
US, especially when using data corrected for measurement errors. Portugal
and Germany also exhibit, to varying degrees, downward nominal rigidity,
but to a notably lesser extent than the very high estimates which can be
obtained for the US. For Finland we ￿nd strong evidence of downward real
wage rigidity and much weaker evidence of this phenomenon in the case of
Belgium.
We show that our general equilibrium heterogenous agent model is able to
match pretty well the cross-sectional wage change distributions observed in
the data. Once the model has been guided and disciplined by the micro ev-
idence, we are able to compute model consistent welfare maximising steady
state in￿ation rates for each country. We ￿nd that for the European coun-
tries considered, optimal in￿ation ranges from 0 (Belgium and Finland) to
2% (Portugal) with Germany occupying an intermediate position. The US
results are highly sensitive to the dataset employed. With data uncorrected
for measurement error, we ￿nd an optimal rate of in￿ation of 2%. However,
using the estimates implied by the corrected data, we arrive at an optimal
rate of 5%, close to the level indicated by Wyplosz (2001) in the introduction.
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Solving the wage setter’s problem
We solve the wage setter’s optimisation problem by means of discrete state
dynamic programming (see, for example, Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004),
Chapter 4). For wages we employ a grid of 151 points with a grid width of
1% (in line with the data available in the context of the IWFP) centered on
the equilibrium wage rate given by the ￿rms marginal productivity condition.
We choose a compatible grid11 of 151 points for the idiosyncratic productivity
state variable qt. The number of gridpoints for qt is larger than would be
strictly necessary in a standard problem; we chose this amount to ensure that
the model is capable of generating histograms of wage changes without gaps.
Taking into account the two possible values of the Bernoulli state variable
that indicates the probability of menu costs, the value function is calculated
over 45,602 (=151x151x2) distinct points.
We assume that the ²t(i) are distributed as iid Laplace (double exponential),
a special case of the two-sided Weibull distribution employed by Dickens et al.
(2007). We approximate the AR process for idiosyncratic productivity by
using the Markov chain approach of Tauchen (1986).
In order to solve the wage setter’s problem, we need values for the param-
eters of the households’ preferences and wage adjustment cost functions.
In addition, the wage setters decisions also depend on aggregate macroeco-
nomic variables (consumption, the aggregate wage rate, aggregate hours, the
in￿ation rate and productivity growth). For the purposes of estimating the
parameters using indirect inference, we take respective values for the relevant
sample periods from the FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis (for the US) and from the European Commission’s AMECO database
for European countries. Speci￿cally, we normalise output and hours to unity.
Then, with this normalisation, we calculate the aggregate wage rate from the
average labour share in the data. Similarly, aggregate consumption is given
by the average share of private consumption in GDP. In￿ation and produc-
tivity growth are the averages calculated for the respective sample periods.
11By compatible, we mean that given our grid for qt the set of optimal wage rates which
would be chosen by households in the absence of adjustment costs would be identical to
the grid for wages.
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these aggregate values are obtained from the model as explained below.
Once we have derived the wage setter’s decision rule (20), the next step is
to derive the stationary joint distribution of the individual state variables,
wt¡1(h) and qt:
F(wi;t¡1;qi;t) = Prob(wt¡1(h) = wi;qt(h) = qi) (33)
We compute this object using the invariant density iteration scheme outlined
in Heer and Maussner (2005). Starting with an initial guess of F we update
as follows. For each point on the w ¤ q joint grid (indexed by i;k), the
discretised decision rule i0 = g(i;k) gives us the index of the optimal choice
of the current wage as a function of the previous period’s wage and the
current value of the individual productivity shock. The transition matrix
for q gives us the probability of qt+1 taking on each of the (1::Ns) possible
values on the grid, indexed by k0, given a current level of qt, indexed by k:
P(k0;k) = Prob[q(h) = qk0jqt(h) = qk] (34)
At each iteration, denoted by j, we start from an initial value for Fj+1 of
zero. Then we update our estimate of Fj+1 by looping over all possible values
of w(i), q(k) and q (k0) and using the discretised decision rule to calculate:
Fj+1(i0;k0) = Fj+1(i0;k0) + P(k0;k)Fj(i;k) (35)
We repeat this process until our estimate of F converges.
Once we have obtained this stationary distribution, we can compute the
distribution of wage levels and, using the decision rule and the transition
matrix, the distribution of wage changes. From the distribution of wage
changes, in turn, we can calculate the moments of interest (e.g. standard
deviation, percent of wage change equal to zero, percent of wage changes less
than zero, etc.).
We can also aggregate over the joint stationary distribution of w and q to
compute the implied aggregate wage rate consistent with eq. (14) in the
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Computing the stationary equilibrium
To compute the stationary equilibrium of the model, for a given in￿ation
rate, we iterate along the following scheme;
1. Pick a value for aggregate hours, L
2. Given this value for L, solve equations (21) to (26) to obtain aggregate
values for C and W (as well as r, K, I and Y ).
3. Given these aggregate variables, solve the wage setters problem as ex-
plained in the previous Section.
4. Derive the stationary distribution for w and q and compute the implied
average wage rate using eq. (36).
5. Compare ¹ W with W. Choose another value for L and repeat steps (1)
to (4) until convergence is achieved ( ¹ W = W).
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of England Working Paper No. 82.Table 1: Data Characteristics
Country Dataset Years Wage measure
Finland Industry Employers Manual 1988-2000 Wages/hour
Workers Association
Germany IAB - Institut f￿r Arbeitsmarkt 1987-2001 Earnings
und Berufsforschung
Portugal Quadros de Pessoal 1991-2006 Wages/hour
U.S. PSID - Panel Study of 1987-1997 Wages/hour
Income Dynamics
Belgium Social Security Records 1990-2002 Earnings
Table 2: Calibrated Model Parameters
Description symbol value
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1
¾ 1
Inverse of labour supply elasticity Â 1.5
Aggregators’s elasticity of labour demand µw
1¡µw -11
Coe￿cient of labour in utility function12 ° 0.85
Depreciation rate ± 0.08
Discount factor (annual) ¯ 0.95
Capital share in production function ® 0.3
Elasticity of demand for ￿nal goods ²p -11
Cost of changing prices Áp 45.0
AR coe￿cient for idiosyncratic prod. shock ½ 0.9
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April 2009Table 3: Wage Setting Parameter Estimates
US 1 US 2 DE PT BE FI
c+ 0.01 - - 0.01 - -
c¡ 0.11 0.37 0.02 0.04 - -
cR - - - - 0.002 0.07
p 0.49 0.81 0.5 0.76 0.5 1.0
¾² 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.03
Table 4: Data: Key Moments of Wage Change Distribution
Statistics US 1 US 2 DE PT BE FI
Mean 0.040 0.039 0.036 0.051 0.045 0.037
Std.Dev 0.075 0.061 0.044 0.058 0.054 0.03
% zero 0.157 0.265 0.076 0.139 0.006 0.01
% <0 0.160 0.069 0.141 0.050 0.098 0.03
Mean (dw>0) 0.072 0.069 0.050 0.068 0.056 0.04
Mean (dw<0) -0.074 -0.087 -0.034 -0.081 -0.050 -0.04
DRWR - - - - 0.593 -
%<inf - - - - - 0.05
Sample 88-97 88-97 88-01 92-06 91-02 00
Table 5: Model: Key Moments of Wage Change Distribution
Statistics US 1 US 2 DE PT BE FI
Mean 0.040 0.039 0.036 0.051 0.045 0.037
Std.Dev 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.03
% zero 0.16 0.26 0.10 0.15 0.04 0.00
% <0 0.16 0.07 0.17 0.15 0.21 0.05
Mean (dw>0) 0.075 0.068 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
Mean (dw<0) -0.073 -0.087 -0.047 -0.05 -0.050 -0.03
DRWR - - - - 0.63 -
%<inf - - - - - 0.05
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Table 6: List of Variables
Y Output L Hours Worked
C Consumption qt(h) Idiosync Prod. shock
I Investment pt price level
Z Government Spending R Interest Rate
K Capital Stock W Wage RateFigure 1: Wage Change Histograms: Data vs Model (a)











US1  − 1987
Percentage wage change










US 1 − Model
percentage wage change









US2  − 1987
Percentage wage change









US 2 − Model
percentage wage change




























Working Paper Series No 1048
April 2009Figure 2: Wage Change Histograms: Data vs Model (b)
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April 2009Figure 5: In￿ation and Welfare - No Wage Adjustment Costs
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April 2009Figure 11: In￿ation and Welfare - Germany
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